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INTRODUCTION
THOMAS

E. CARBONNEAU*

This symposium attests to the depth of scholarship that

now surrounds the law of arbitration and to arbitration's widening adjudicatory mission in matters international and domestic.
Authored by senior and emerging scholars who share a commitment to professional excellence, the various contributions not
only assure continuity in arbitral scholarship, but also underscore the growing sophistication of arbitral practice and illustrate the complexity of the relationship between arbitration and
the legal process. This symposium represents an inquiry into the
convergence and divergence of legal and arbitral adjudicatory

values and what impact these similarities and differences might
have upon the functioning and continued legitimacy of the arbi-

tral process.
The emergence of arbitration in domestic law from the confines of specialty areas has occurred with surprising alacrity,
especially in the United States with the recent decisional law of
* Professor of Law and Director, Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative Law,
Tulane University. Dipl6me Suprieur d'Etudes Frangaises 1971, Universit6 de Poitiers;
A.B. 1972, Bowdoin College; B.A. 1975, Oxford University; M.A. 1979, University of
Virginia; M.A. 1979, Oxford University; J.D. 1978, University of Virginia; LL.M. 1979,
J.S.D. 1984, Columbia University.
[Editor's note:
The Tulane Law Review is grateful for the assistance and guidance provided by
Professor Carbonneau in connection with this issue. Without his efforts this arbitration
symposium would not have been possible.]
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the United States Supreme Court. In the transnational sphere,
the internationalization of commerce and the willingness of
states to privatize trade policy and other political disputes have
contributed to the magnified stature of arbitration. The heightened popularity of arbitration in increasingly variegated dispute
areas has created concerns relating to what form of justice is
available and achievable in arbitration and, relatedly, whether
the traditional concept of justice has been redefined by the reference to arbitration.
In particular, do legal norms (as to matters of both procedure and substance) survive in whole or in part once they are
integrated into the process of arbitral adjudication? Moreover,
is their survival or status in arbitration at all relevant in evaluating the operation of the arbitral process? Arbitration, after all, is
a substitute for judicial adjudication; party recourse to arbitration is a bargain for another mode of dispute resolution, devoid
simultaneously of the values and the problems that characterize
the legal process of adjudication. Legality, nonetheless, remains
important to the arbitral process. Basic lawfulness is instrumental to its continued viability. At times, arbitral agreements and
awards must be enforced coercively through court proceedings.
The arbitral process, therefore, must comply with minimal legal
standards in order to remain functional in the critical circumstance of party noncompliance.
As a number of contributors make apparent, most national
statutes on arbitration unhesitatingly attribute systemic autonomy to the arbitral process and require further that municipal
courts cooperate with, assist, and support arbitration. In effect,
under contemporary law, the requirements of legality are not
much of a restraint upon the exercise of arbitral authority or
jurisdiction; they demand, in a general way, a basic regard for
procedural fairness and some protection for the fundamental
public policy concerns of the implicated jurisdiction. The reluctance of states to interfere with arbitral agreements and determinations, although it promotes the autonomy of the arbitral
process, has engendered an unfortunate and dangerous situation
of nearly complete license. In particular, the statutory deregulation of arbitration poses the danger that an unbridled arbitral
process, employed in a wider variety of domestic and international dispute contexts, could eventually undermine its own
legitimacy. Deregulation initially insulates arbitration from
intrusion by contradistinctive legal values, but some of those val-
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ues are instrumental to the integrity of any adjudicatory process.
Their absence leads to a lack of both procedural limitations and
jurisdictional definition. An unfettered adjudicatory process can
result in abuses that significantly compromise basic rights and
provide inadequate or untoward remedial relief. Clear boundaries are necessary between the arbitral and legal processes for the
benefit of arbitration so that it can preserve the legitimacy that
proceeds from meaningful legal constraints.
The problems generated by statutory deregulation and the
rise of absolute arbitral autonomy have been especially pronounced in United States arbitration law. In recent pronouncements, the United States Supreme Court has nearly eviscerated
the inarbitrability defense to arbitration and, as a consequence,
lessened significantly the role of public policy and judicial
authority in arbitration law. Is arbitration intended or able to
provide adjudicatory relief for both regulatory and contractual
disputes? Can a judicial policy proclaiming the arbitrability of
statutory rights be applied indiscriminately in both domestic and
international cases? While international arbitrators may be
uniquely positioned to elaborate an international law merchant,
should national statutory law nevertheless maintain some form
of application in international cases through municipal judicial
interpretation in matters vital to national interests?
The phenomenon of arbitral autonomy also has had an
impact upon the exercise of arbitral jurisdictional authority in
both domestic and international proceedings. Should arbitrators
be allowed to award punitive damages or other forms of
extraordinary relief as part of their ordinary powers to adjudicate disputes? Such authority appears to supercede party prerogatives in contract. The enforcement of arbitration
agreements of questionable validity in the setting of consumer
claims reflects another excess of would-be arbitral autonomy. It
manifestly violates the consensual character of the recourse to
arbitration. Because it is a form of purely private justice, arbitration cannot act as a mechanism for expressing or (much less)
protecting the public interest. The redefinition of arbitration's
stature under the auspices of the deregulatory movement has
resulted in an ambitious and ill-conceived recasting of the institution of arbitral adjudication-without proper regard for the
values at stake on either side of the adjudicatory equation.
The use of arbitration in state and federal statutes implementing alternative dispute resolution frameworks also has com-
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plicated and confused the law of arbitration. Court-annexed
arbitration, like the use of arbitration to resolve securities disputes, is not an ordinary application of the arbitral mechanism.
To some extent, it is a sui generis and novel use of the existing
framework; court-annexed arbitration represents a different
form of arbitration that provides for yet another avenue of arbitral justice. Moreover, in this regard, it should be noted that
commercial, maritime, and labor arbitrations, despite their similarities, are likewise separable forms of arbitration that service
different adjudicatory needs and communities. The justice
achieved in each of them may vary and the role of legality in
relation to each of them may differ as well. The various
branches of arbitral activity must be joined and their distinctive
character retained in order to produce comprehensive and meaningful arbitration law. By their diversity, the contributions in
this symposium begin that difficult and complex task.
There are other issues that attend the development of arbitration law and its evolving relationship with the legal process.
For example, what role should lawyers and the traditional concept of litigation play in arbitral proceedings? Should there be
broad and liberal discovery as a matter of right in arbitral proceedings or should the question be resolved on an ad hoc basis
by arbitrators in individual cases? American lawyerly values do
appear to be the antithesis of arbitral procedural flexibility. In
this regard, can the ethic of arbitral flexibility remain workable
in light of more sophisticated legal representation? Is justice by
so-called approximation and through arbitrator discretion
acceptable to the legal community? Might such a process not
only encroach unduly upon basic legal norms, but also substantially disappoint party expectations? Do regulatory claims
demand a level of formalism that is inapposite to the ethic of
arbitration? Can arbitration remain functional outside the consensus of specialized communities? The trust that has been and
must necessarily be placed in the arbitrators may have to be supplemented with some type of public exposure and scrutiny of
proceedings and awards in order to maintain the legitimacy of
an expanded arbitral process. Again, the contributions break
ground by bringing these difficult issues of redefinition, adaptation, and adjustment to the fore. As a whole, they emphasize
that arbitration law has reached a critical juncture in its evolution where the very role and function of arbitration (for the sake
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of the institution itself and the adjudicatory values it represents)
warrant a thorough reexamination.
The success of arbitration in matters of international trade
and commerce has been immense, but the continued operation of
the arbitral process in that area also raises a host of potential
problems. Arbitration is being employed experimentally as a
mechanism by which to resolve sovereign conflicts. The question becomes how far the delegation of sovereign authority to
arbitration can extend. How much privatization is possible?
How autonomous can arbitration remain in this context? Is the
reference to arbitration likely to result in fair and binding determinations? The recourse to arbitration in this setting also may
require a substantial restructuring of existing arbitral procedures
and a possible reconsideration of the adjudicatory gravamen of
the process. Relatedly, arbitration may prove to be a useful
mechanism by which to resolve the problems associated with the
international debt crisis. Here, too, the established framework
may need to be customized to the particular character of the
situation, resulting in yet another sui generis form of international arbitration. Moreover, the continued use of arbitration in
international commerce raises questions pertaining to whether
the acceptance of arbitration by developing countries is a necessary first step to participation in international trade; whether the
procedure of arbitration should be accompanied by the application of a law that equalizes the disparities in national economic
development; whether arbitral procedures should be modeled
upon civil-law or common-law notions of procedural regularity;
and whether some form of stare decisis and decisional content
should accompany arbitral awards.
The articles that follow confront many of the vital issues of
international and domestic arbitration law. They contain
sophisticated, thorough, and well-documented discussions of
these questions. The teaching of this symposium does much to
advance the content of arbitration law and the understanding
that is necessary to adapt the institution of arbitral adjudication
to its new but precarious vocation in domestic and international
dispute resolution.

